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I.

INTRODUCTION

66INTRAMURAL reforms"

are measures by which the U.S.

I courts of appeals have adapted the traditional appellate procedures that have historically performed the appellate role and function
in our federal system. These reforms amount to procedural shortcuts,
resulting in an abbreviated appellate process, justified primarily by the
press of docket. For convenience, the various intramural reforms have
been grouped here by appellate function: oral argument, briefing,
opinion writing, case management techniques, and staffing arrangements.
The federal appellate system has been under pressure from a crisis
of case volume. Like a living organism, the system has adapted to

* Adapted with permission from THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON
APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, Chapter 6, Copyright
1993 by West Publishing Co. This book began as a report of the Justice Research Institute for
the Federal Judicial Center. This chapter was adapted, in part, with permission from Thomas E.
Baker, A Compendium of Proposalsto Reform the United States Court of Appeals, 37 U. FLA.
L. REv. 225 (1985). The views and positions expressed here are those of the author alone.
** Alvin R. Allison Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.S. cum laude,
1974, Florida State University; J.D. with high honors, 1977, University of Florida.
The author is grateful for the suggestions and comments of: The Honorable Levin H. Campbell; The Honorable John C. Godbold; Professor Arthur D. Hellman; The Honorable James C.
Hill; Professor A. Leo Levin; The Honorable Richard A. Posner; William K. Slate, 1I,Esquire;
The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace; and The Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr. Thanks are owed to
Diana Nichols and Michael S. Truesdale for their able research assistance.

914

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:913

meet those stresses. Without such adaptations, the system would not
have survived. The evolution, however, has already resulted in serious
compromises in the ideals and traditional function of the federal appellate courts. Furthermore, "intramural reforms," the judge-made
changes discussed in this Article, appear to be exhausted. This is to
suggest, at the outset, that whatever added efficiency or additional appellate capacity that might be realized from intramural reforms has
already been achieved in most courts of appeals.
One final introductory note concerns the approach taken in this Article to identify and to summarize almost all of the reforms that have
been implemented over the years. The regional courts are separate and
designedly distinct institutions, and are likely to remain so, unless
Congress enacts some major structural or extramural reform. The
First Circuit, with a handful of judges and a small geographic area,
functions quite differently from the geographically large Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit has a docket concentrated in one city. The
Fifth Circuit bore the responsibility of dismantling de jure segregation
and continues to deal with its aftermath. The Eleventh Circuit must
deal with many petitions for relief in state death penalty cases. The
District of Columbia Circuit presides over a docket originating in the
federal seat of government that is dominated by difficult and complex
issues of administrative law.
Indeed, a case could be made that each of the courts of appeals has
something of a unique social and judicial culture. Hence, the point
must be made explicit that generalization is not always appropriate.
Not all the problems noted here are found in every court of appeals,
and the reforms that have been or might be successful in one court of
appeals would not necessarily transfer to others. Still, there is some
value in collecting these intramural reforms to better understand what
the problems are, what solutions have been tried, and what might be
done further to solve the problems facing the U.S. courts of appeals.'

1. See generally Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United
States Courts of Appeals, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 225, 243-62 (1985). William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 623

(1988); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Jud. Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 3.

Internal operating procedures have been used by the federal courts for decades but became the
object of study in the 1980s. These procedures serve three functions: (1) to codify appellate court

practices; (2) to achieve some uniformity in how appeals are processed; and (3) to inform the bar
about the court's internal practices. Any overall evaluation of internal operating procedures in
the various circuits is problematic for two reasons. First, usually there is little, if any, data collected about the effect of a new procedure within a particular circuit. New experimental proce-

dures are always being proposed and implemented but rarely are they evaluated empirically.
Second, the general lack of informatiori renders any attempt at comparative analysis across cir-
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1I.

ORAL ARGUMENT

The external stress of caseload has changed oral argument practices
dramatically. The theory for this change was ably stated in a syllogism
by then-Chief Judge Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit. 2 First, appellate
cases are not fungible, and courts can articulate and apply differentiating standards and procedures. Second, judicial resources are finite,
and caseload demand outstrips supply and will continue to do so.
Thus, the logic goes, an appellate court should be conceded the discretion to choose not to hear oral arguments in some appeals.'
Following the recommendation of the Commission on the Revision
of the Federal Court Appellate System, 4 Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 34 was amended in 1979 to provide for oral argument "in
all cases" unless, under a local rule, a three-judge panel unanimously
agrees it is not needed after examining the briefs and record.' The
local rule must articulate a standard that establishes oral argument as
the norm. Three situations justify a departure from the norm: "(1) the
appeal is frivolous; or (2) the dispositive issue or set of issues has been
recently authoritatively decided; or (3) the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." ' This national rule is an improvement over some preexisting local rules that
had provided a bald power to deny oral argument whenever the "case
is of such character as not to justify oral argument."' Such a stan-

cuit lines almost wholly speculative or subjective. Thus one critical need of the federal appellate
system is for comparative study of how different courts of appeals go about handling appeals.

See generally William K. Slate II, Internal OperatingProcedures - The World of Possibilities,
1993 National Workshop for Judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in Washington, DC (Feb. 710, 1993) (Author has transcript of speech).
2. See generally John C. Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure:Better Use of
Available Facilities, 66 A.B.A. J. 863 (1980).
3. Id. at 864.
4. Commission on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal

Procedures:Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 253-55 (1975) [hereinafter Commission on Revision).
5. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a). The amendment codified the practice that already prevailed
among the courts of appeals. The Fifth Circuit had begun to experiment with a nonargument
summary calendar in the late 1960s as one means of coping with its burgeoning caseload. See
generally Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 265-69. See also STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE

CoURTs § 3.35 (1977) (denial appropriate "if the court concludes from a review of the briefs and
record of the case that its deliberation would not be significantly aided by oral argument....
[But] it should permit the parties to submit a written statement of reasons why oral argument
should be allowed.").

6. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a).
7. Charles R. Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the "New" NationalCourt of Appeals: Can
the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 866 (1976) (citations omitted).
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dardless approach permitted a panel or a judge, on their own or on
the recommendation of a law clerk, to deny oral argument by intuition.8 Still, the current national rule for departing from the stated
norm of oral argument amounts to an empty set of words. Its logic is
hopelessly circular. The first reason-that the appeal is frivolous-is
duplicated by the second reason-that the dispositive issue has been
authoritatively decided-which is merely an example of a frivolous
appeal and which, in turn, is merely one of an indefinite number of
examples of the third reason-that the decisional process would not
be aided-which finally and merely states a conclusion and ultimately
provides no guidance. This is not a standard at all. The underlying
drafting problem may be that any formulation necessarily would
amount to the circular statement that there should be oral argument
when oral argument would be helpful to the court. Perhaps it would
be better to admit this and to draft a rule with a stated preference for
oral argument under which either the judges or one of the parties
could opt for an oral argument. Such a rule would change the contemporary reality that the parties may request oral argument but it is up
to the judges to decide whether to grant the request based on the
judges' conclusion about the helpfulness of argument in the particular
appeal.
Perhaps because a denial of oral argument runs against the American appellate tradition, local practices typically place further limits on
the panel's discretion to deny argument. Eleventh Circuit Local Rule
34-3 is fairly typical.9 Under this rule, a screening panel (three judges
assigned together for a year) must unanimously classify a case for the
nonargument calendar. At any time before decision, any one of the
three judges can reclassify the appeal for the oral argument calendar,
without explanation. Additionally, the decision on the merits must be
unanimous and without special concurring or dissenting opinions unless all the parties agree to nonargument.1 0
Nationwide, between 40% and 50% of the appeals decided on the
merits by the courts of appeals in recent years are being decided without oral argument. In 1990, this ranged from the high of the Fifth
Circuit (69.90%o) to the low of the Second Circuit (24.20)." Today
fewer than half of the courts of appeals hear arguments in half of the
8. Id.
9. 11 TH CIR. R. 34-3. See generally Godbold, supra note 2.
10. 1ITH Cut. R. 34-3. See generally Godbold, supra note 2.
11. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 75 (1990); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
"'Bureaucracy"of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871, 894 (1983). But see infra note 24.
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appeals they decide. Furthermore, when oral arguments are allowed,
they are abbreviated; several courts routinely give some cases fifteen
minutes of argument per side.' 2 The available data likewise only suggests that argument rates vary considerably across the subject-matters
of appeals. 3 Appeals on commercial issues, for example, antitrust and
securities regulations, are almost always given argument.' 4 Other issues are less likely to receive the full attention of oral argument; for
example, immigration and nationalization issues and social security
appeals are granted oral argument less than half the time. 5 The regional differences among the circuits make such generalizations quite
tenuous, however. In some circuits, for example, the rate of oral arguments in criminal appeals far exceeds the rate in civil appeals, while in
other circuits arguments are afforded civil appeals at a much higher
rate.' 6 Some circuits from time to time have followed a compromise
practice of assigning several additional cases to an argument panel for
decision without oral argument. Then the panel will discuss these appeals at their conference and either decide them along with the orally
argued appeals or order an oral argument to be held before another
panel. Such a procedure provides an opportunity for judge-to-judge
argument, if not advocate-to-judge argument. There has been some
informal experimentation to allow judicial law clerks to sit in on the
panel conferences about the nonargued cases as surrogates for counsel. Whether or not an oral argument is held in an appeal does seem to
be related to outcome: cases not argued are likely to be affirmed and
are affirmed at a higher percentage than cases afforded an argument. '7
The savings in judicial resources and private litigants' resources
supposedly are apparent. Then-Chief Judge Godbold concluded:
In a simple case in which the result is clear and no close or significant
issues of law are involved, transporting counsel to the place of
holding court and paying them for attendance is a waste of societal
assets in a world where there are other priorities ....
Perhaps most
important of all, the appellate court's function and value are
demeaned by requiring it to carry out acts merely ceremonial, while
pretending the facade is real."

12.
13.

Robel, supranote 1, at 47-48.
ld. at 48.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Godbold, supra note 2, at 865.
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Arguably, in some cases an appeal involving settled principles may get
even closer attention during the screening determination, when the
judges determine if cases can be decided summarily, without oral argument. Each judge will consider the issue seriatim in chambers by
focusing on a draft opinion, rather than the alternative of participating in what could amount to only a cursory discussion after a truncated, ritualized argument.
Even such an enlightened procedure, however, must generate some
public policy concerns for the appellate ideal. 19 Oral argument is not
necessary in all cases, but is it not almost intuitive that it should be
permitted in more than half of the cases or, looking at the statistics in
the Fifth Circuit, in more than one out of four of the appeals? Several
reasons support this intuition.
First, the court-time saved by eliminating oral argument is relatively
small. The relative amount of time an appellate judge spends preparing for and conducting oral argument is not great, even when multiplied by three to account for the hearing panel. Practices vary from
court to court and from judge to judge, of course, and this generalization admittedly is speculative. In some chambers, preparation for oral
argument and the week away at the sitting take up a substantial portion of the judge's monthly schedule when there is a panel hearing.
Briefs are read. Additional research may be done. Bench memoranda
are prepared. Being away from the judge's home station can make
working on other matters more difficult during the hearing week.
Travel itself is a burden. However, the overall impression from many
chambers is--at least, relatively speaking-that a judge spends considerably more time performing other judicial duties unrelated to the
specific task of the fifteen- or twenty-minute oral argument. This
speculation is incremental during a month with an argument and over
the entire year. A smaller generalization may prove less controversial:
the judge-time expended to decide an appeal with an oral argument is
only incrementally greater than the judge-time expended to decide the
nonargued appeal. However, the missed opportunity to test and confirm a theory of the case face-to-face with counsel and colleagues may
20
conceivably result in a longer decision time for some appeals.
Second, the government should be reluctant to step in to preempt
private ordering of litigants' affairs to save private resources. The in19. Courts have steadfastly rejected constitutional due process challenges to the practice.
See, e.g., George W. Bennett Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co., 502 F.2d 1045, 1050-51 (5th
Cir. 1974); Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1969); Groendyke Transp.,
Inc., v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
20. Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 558 (1969).
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visible hand of the market is more trustworthy than a robed planner.
Nonargument could remain a private option when the appellant
chooses or if the parties agree. Of course, even if the parties waived
oral argument, the court could always require it when appropriate or
necessary or even when the court concluded it might possibly be helpful. That would be more of a market allocation. It may be that the
percentage of orally argued appeals would not change if the attorneys
were given an option to demand an oral argument. Perhaps, members
of the appellate bar would succumb to what can be perceived to be the
contemporary de-emphasis of the oral argument. Perhaps, appellate
attorneys would discount time at the podium because of changes in
the economics of the legal profession. Perhaps, they would waive oral
argument more often than not because of their underlying confidence
in the nonargument procedure and their willingness to take their best
chance at written persuasion in the briefs. At the very least, such an
experiment in market allocation would be one way to test some of the
judicial assumptions behind the nonargument calendar.
The real systemic costs of the lost oral argument are felt in terms of
legitimating the judicial function, establishing communication between bench and bar, and allowing judges the opportunity to ask
questions and to focus thoughtfully on the major issues. 2 1 An important value of oral argument lies in the legitimating function of allowing the litigants, to address the decisionmaker face-to-face. A related
value is the opportunity for the advocates to encounter and respond to
whatever filtering of the record and the law that may have been performed for the judges by otherwise unseen staff, either in the clerk's
office or in chambers. In these ways, the increasingly wholesale denial
of oral argument represents a serious threat to the achievement of the
22
appellate ideal.

21. See Don Babwin, Appealing OralArguments, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 19. See generally Robert S. Thompson & John B. Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate Courts:
How Funny Things Happen on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1; Stephen L.
Washy, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some Views of Lawyers
and FederalJudges, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 344-48 (1982). Some courts of appeals, most notably
the Fifth Circuit, have experimented informally with the procedure whereby the judges on the
hearing panel provide counsel with written questions before oral argument. No federal court has
reported experimenting to propound written questions in lieu of oral argument. However, some
state intermediate courts have experimented with writing and distributing a tentative opinion to
the attorneys before oral argument, and then issuing a final version shortly after hearing argument.
22. PAUL D. CARRINTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 17 (1976). See also Jerry Goldman,
Appellate Justice Economized: Screening and Its Effect on Outcomes and Legitimacy, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE -

THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FED.

COURTS 138 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990).
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Both the problem and its solution are unattractive. In a majority of
appeals, a practice of central importance to the appellate function has
been eliminated, at least in part, to preserve its use in other appeals in
which it is deemed more critical. 23 In the process, the federal court
system has moved farther away from the ideal. Oral argument should
not be an absolute right, but the denial rate seems to have outgrown
the announced justification for denial. Not surprisingly, an inverse
proportion has developed between the reversal rate and the growth in
the nonargument calendar.2 4 Furthermore, when Congress has added
judges to a circuit in the past thus presumably easing somewhat the
docket pressure, the nonargument calendar has remained constant.
One possible explanation could be supposed that, under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 34(a), almost half of the federal appeals are
"(1) frivolous" or "(2) unauthoritative." A more likely explanation,
however, is that the catch-all "(3) adequate briefing and insignificant
for oral argument" is being used to establish a docket median below
which expediency permits below average appellate process in an individual case. This suggestion is troubling. The experience of the Second
Circuit, which alone among the courts of appeals provides oral argument as a matter of course in three-fourths of its appeals despite a
large docket, may be a final counter-example, and suggests that the
have been too hasty in elimiother Federal courts of appeals appear to
25
nating oral arguments in so many cases.
The position of criticism taken here is not to insist that the judges
should act irresponsibly to guarantee oral argument in every appeal,
and thereby create undue appellate delay. It must be conceded that
"even if there were no caseload pressures, there would still be a place
for the [screening program] to get the junk out of the system." 26 The
concern expressed here is that the design of the system has been compromised, severely and profoundly, and possibly irremediably, by
such proportionally high rates of denial of oral argument.

23.

Wasby, supra note 21, at 342, 353.

24. See Haworth, supra note 7, at 318; John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The
Ninth Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovationsfor the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.

859, 898.
25. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FED. JijD. SYSTEM 23-27
(1981); Oakley, supra note 24, at 863-64. This argument must be qualified by the admission that
more than three-fourths of the docket comes from New York City so that only a taxi ride to the
courthouse is involved and then the oral argument often is a 10- or 15-minute exchange. See
Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv.

297, 303-07 (1986).
26.

JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STtENSTRA, FEDERAL JUD. CTR., DECmINO CASES WITHOUT AR-

GUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS 136 (1987) (quoting an anonymous

judge).
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The importance of oral argument to the appellate function is conceded by the judges themselves.2 7 The American Bar Association
adopted a resolution in 1974 (that in 1995 sounds like a plea for the
preservation of some endangered species) criticizing the trend then
just beginning to develop in the courts of appeals to dispense with oral
argument and urging that this important appellate tradition be preserved. 2 No less an advocate than Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr
more recently expressed the continued dismay of the bar.29 Besides appellate practitioners, the drastically reduced rates of oral arguments
have been the target of sustained criticism from academic commentators, as well.30
The Federal Judicial Center has sponsored two studies of case
screening and the reduction in oral arguments. The first compilation
described the various procedures used by the courts of appeals.', The
second, more important, study, presented a thorough evaluation and
comparison of the actual screening practices in the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits. 3 2 Although the second study confirmed that circuit
judges continue to view oral argument as important in the abstract,"
the study reached several other interrelated conclusions about how
screening procedures and the summary nonargument calendar are administered in the circuits: (1) screening procedures are designed in the
abstract for flexibility to allow the individual judge to balance appellate procedural values in particular appeals; (2) screening procedures
in practice reflect the range of individual judicial attitudes toward oral
argument; (3) there is no direct correlation between the formal written
procedures and the rate of oral argument; (4) the circuit judges' attitudes toward oral argument override the particular features formally
stated in the screening protocol; (5) there are substantial, seemingly
inexplicable, variations among the circuits (for example, the Third
Circuit decided a substantially higher percentage of appeals without

27. See, e.g., Donald MeG. Rose, Oral Argument in the Sixth Circuit, 19 U. TOL. L. REv.
229, 231-32 (1988) (interviews with Sixth Circuit judges).
28. See CECIL & STIENSTRA, supra note 26, at 12.
29. See Kenneth w. Starr, The Courts of Appeals and the Future of the FederalJudiciary,
1991 Wis. L. REv. 1, 6.
30. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 631.
31.

JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUD. CTR., DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGU-

MENT: A DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS (1985). Appeals must first be
screened to assign them to a nonargument calendar. Although the procedures vary, most courts
of appeals then rely on a separate summary apparatus to decide the screened cases.
32. Id.
33. "Each judge differs in the weights he [or she] gives to [the various] purposes [of oral
argument], resulting in a broad range of opinions among judges concerning the need for oral
argument." CECIL & STIENSTRA, supra note 26, at 160.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

922

[Vol. 22:913

oral argument yet did not rely on central staff attorneys); (6) many
judges share a concern that there is a kind of judicial peer pressure in
screened appeals making them reluctant to -state a preference for oral
argument; (7) notwithstanding the judges' assertions that nonargued
cases are carefully studied and fully decided, parties often are not convinced that their appeals are being thoroughly reviewed; (8) generally,
the role of staff attorneys is greater in summary calendar, nonargued
appeals; (9) generally, the perceived savings of time in screening programs derives primarily from the additional time and resources provided by staff attorneys and is not a direct consequence of the
screening procedures; (10) at the time of the study, the rate of nonargument dispositions had been growing and continued to be on the
rise.3 4 The study raises many more critical questions about the assumptions underlying the summary nonargument calendar procedures
in the courts of appeals and suggests several directions for further
study, which still deserve to be pursued. The relevant overall explanation offered by the study is that the nonargument procedures are first
developed and then grow in importance and usage when a court of
appeals "isin crisis and searching for a way to solve its problems." 3
This "solution," however, represents a profound threat to a critical
part of the appellate function:
Although oral argument may be thought of primarily as a method
for obtaining information about a case, this is only a threshold
purpose for many judges. Judges also rely on oral argument to
demonstrate to the parties that the members of the panel have
attended to the issues raised on appeal, to permit interaction with
members of the bar, to provide a forum for the presentation of
issues of public concern, to acknowledge the court's responsibility
for resolving such disputes, and to provide an opportunity for the
36
judges to confer and hear each other's views.
Deciding an appeal without oral argument "reduces the judges' involvement in the case, makes them less accountable to litigants, and
decreases the visibility of the appellate process." 3 7 And even if the best
of our judges somehow can otherwise achieve these goals, an appeal
decided without oral argument, by definition, makes it less likely that
the panel will focus on the case at the same time, which is a critical

34.
study.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1-5, 159-68. The seriatim list in the text is a simplification of a sophisticated
Id. at 165.
Id. at 159-60.
Robel, supra note 1, at 49.
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part of the raison d'etre of designating a panel of judges to review the
work of a single trial judge in the first place. 38 As is so often the case,
a central feature of collegial decision making is traded off for efficiency.
The promise in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34, echoed in
the local rules of the courts of appeals, has been rendered rather Orwellian by the circuit judges' collective response to the caseload crisis,
which in effect has reversed the presumption in favor of oral argument in every appeal to what amounts to a de facto presumption that
most appeals can be decided without oral argument. Furthermore, this
diminution of oral argument may have resulted in lowered expectations and lesser performances from the bar, which in turn create additional momentum against oral argument. Ultimately, this de facto
reform rejects the received tradition for the federal appellate ideal.
After conceding that oral argument is still the ideal, one circuit judge
was heard to say, "I'll be frank about it, it is not possible with this
caseload to practice the ideal." 3 9
III.

BRIEFING

As has just been described, the federal appellate courts have reduced
oral argument dramatically as part of their effort to cope with increased
filings. In making that choice, the judges have necessarily afforded
greater emphasis and importance to the written presentation to the
court. Written briefs have several inherent advantages 0 Written submissions have an "absorption advantage" over the evanescent oral presentation, which is said and gone. 41 In a process with a written opinion as
an end product, the briefs serve as critical input. Briefs also are portable
and convenient. Moreover, a common attitude exists among lawyers and
judges that the brief generally is better prepared than the oral argument.42 In the appellate ideal, the briefs would fully present the litigants'
positions and would anticipate all of the judges' doubts, questions and
confusions. In the appellate reality, that ideal is "seldom realized" because mere mortals write and read briefs. 43 Attorneys need the appellate
38.
39.

Id.

CECIL & STIENSTRA, supra note 26, at 133.
40. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 22, at 25-27.
41. Id. at 25. While most courts record oral arguments, one may question whether the
judges replay the tapes or whether the practice is designed chiefly to aid the absent law clerk in
later drafting an opinion. The tapes become significant, if at all, on the issue of concessions or
stipulations. Undoubtedly, some judges who still draft their own opinions use the tapes themselves, particularly in complex and difficult cases. See 5TH CIR. R. 34.7 (tape recordings are for

the exclusive use of the court).
42. See Wasby, supranote 21, at 352-53.
43. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 632.
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argument to supplement their presentations and to seek to persuade the
court; judges need the appellate argument to understand the issues and
to decide the appeal collegially, face-to-face with the advocates and with
each other. Thus, briefs are an essential part of the received appellate
tradition, and written presentations to the court continue to perform a
critical role in the appellate function. 4
Some commentators would de-emphasize briefs, however, because
they believe that oral argument is more conducive to appellate procedural imperatives. 4 The idea of dispensing with briefs goes too far, although that is the English tradition and was the early American
experience.' 6 More realistically, the idea of a separate oral calendar
would allow for short written submissions. This would produce true
"briefs."
The Ninth Circuit experimented with such a program on a voluntary
basis. 47 With this approach, written submissions are very short and filing
time is greatly reduced. The oral argument session becomes the arena
for presentation, advocacy, and decision.4 While this approach seems
theoretically feasible, experience is limited. This may be largely due to
the rejection of experimenting with a briefing de-emphasis already implicitly made in the nonargument calendar, which chooses instead to deemphasize orality, and which has been much more common in the
courts of appeals.
Perhaps not enough has been done to test this implicit choice. The
chief worry for these experiments is whether such a truncated briefing
procedure would give the parties adequate opportunity to present argument in written form.4 9 A program of deciding federal appeals with reduced reliance on written argument, presumably, would place greater
reliance on oral argument." Of course, some litigants would be willing
to trade some of the traditional trappings of appellate procedures for a
less expensive and more expeditious procedure. Any such program
ought to be optional with the litigants, not the court, and ought to allow

44. See id. at 630-31. But see Wade H. McCree, BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 790 (1981).
45. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 22, at 26.

46. Id. at 27-28.
47. For a description, see Joy A. Chapper, Fast, Faster,Fastest; Appellate Courts Develop
Special Tracks to Fight Delay, 19 JUDGES' J., Spring 1981, at 50, 56. See also JOE S. CECIL,
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS

PROJECT 46-78 (1985).
48. See Joy A. Chapper & Roger A. Hanson, Expedited Proceduresfor Appellate Courts:
Evidence from California'sThird DistrictCourt of Appeal, 42 MD. L. REV. 696, 697-98 (1983).
49. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 5, § 3.31.
50. See Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD.
L. REV. 732 (1983).
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the parties to "submit either summary briefs (which outlining the argument and briefly summarizing the holdings in cases relied upon) or conventional briefs, with a page-length limitation of ten to fifteen pages."'"
This may be one of the few areas of intramural reform that has not been
explored sufficiently by the courts of appeals.
IV.

OPINION WRITINO

Besides oral argument and brief writing, the appellate opinion is a
third highly visible component of appellate procedure. There are various
ways of dealing with delay and backlog through intramural reforms to
improve opinion writing, to eliminate some opinions altogether, and to
restrict the publication and citation of opinions in some appeals. 2 The
approaches are related because, for example, the unpublished opinion
frequently is shorter than the published variety. How this appellate function is performed is decidedly important in the allocation of judicial resources because nearly one-half of an appellate judge's time involves
opinion preparation. 3 This reality attracts reformers to the opinion writing process.
A.

The Purposesof Written Opinions

Although the art of good opinion writing should be encouraged, admittedly not every record on appeal presents a canvas deserving of a
masterpiece.-4 Too much of the appellate process is lost, however, unless
the artist is obligated to apply at least a few brush strokes beyond the
signature. The ultimate integrity of the appellate process requires that
courts state their reasons. This is part and parcel of the common law
tradition of deciding appeals. Quantity/quality tradeoffs are frequently
argued and, properly, have been pursued, because opinion writing is the
most labor intensive feature of the appellate process.
An opinion serves three critical purposes.56 First, litigants and the
public are assured the decision is the product of reasoned judgment and
51. John E. Shapard, Appeals Without Briefs: Evaluation of an Appeals Expediting Program in the Ninth Circuit, reprinted in MANAGING APPEALS IN FED. COURTS 441, 452 (Federal
Jud. Ctr. ed., 1988).

52.
BOLDEN,

Much has been written on the subject. For a selective bibliography, see generally C. E.
A SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SURVEY 17-21
APPELLATE OPINION PREPARATION -

(1978). See also infra notes 52-120.
53. See Haworth, supra note 7, at 867-68.
54. See Irving Younger, On Jud. Opinions Consideredas One of the Fine Arts: The Coen
Lecture, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (1980); but see Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and
Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 (1981). See generally Thomas E. Baker, A Review of
Corpus JurisHumorous, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 869 (1993).
55. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 22, at 31.
56. Charles M. Merrill, Could Judges Deliver More Justice if They Wrote Fewer Opinions?,
64 JUDICATURE 435 (1981).
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thoughtful evaluation rather than the mere exercise of whim and caprice. Second, the very writing of an opinion reinforces decisionmaking
and ensures correctness. Third, appellate opinions are the life stream of
the common law, for they create precedents."
The first purpose arguably may be served without a written opinion in
every appeal. Granted, there needs to be sufficient writing in a sufficient
percentage of appeals to assure the general public that the appellate
courts are not acting altogether arbitrarily or casually. 8 But neither the
general public nor the particular litigants would have that assurance in
any given opinionless decision. The litigants themselves are especially deserving of some formal explanation.59 Of course, arbitrariness can always be hidden with a pretextual opinion, but to be that cynical obliges
a belief in affirmative deceit on the part of the judges, not just arbitrariness. A writing requirement does by definition serve, at least, to constrain arbitrariness.
The second purpose for requiring a written statement in all appeals is
to ensure an important discipline for decision. A decisionmaker who
must reason through to a conclusion in print has reasoned in fact. Misconceptions and oversights of fact and law are discoverable in the process of writing. Everyone familiar with the appellate process has heard
and used the expression, "It will not write that way," to mean that a
tentative vote will not withstand the careful discipline of record reading,
legal research, and opinion drafting. Yet, without a writing requirement
some tentative votes would escape such scrutiny. Theoretically, opinion
writing prolongs the process and, on occasion, a correct decision that
has been unduly delayed may be as detrimental as an incorrect decision.6 The appropriate response for the appeal where time is of the essence, however, is to expedite the exceptional case for quick hearing and
decision with a brief opinion.6 I Indeed, on occasion it might be appropriate to announce a decision with an opinion to follow. In the balance
of interests involved, the value of self-restraint provided by writing deserves greater weight than the value of efficiency gained through decision by edict. Reasoned decision is possible, but is sufficiently less likely
without writing that the writing requirement should be preserved at al-

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 435.
This is not to suggest that litigants have a constitutional right to a written opinion, but,

after all, a decision on the record and a statement of reasons are both part and parcel of the
procedural due process that courts routinely impose on the other branches as a general matter of
hornbook law. See JOHN E. NowAK, ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 451-52 (3d ed. 1986); Henry J.
Friendly, "Some Kind ofa Hearing". 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975).
60. Merrill, supra note 56, at 435.
61. See, e.g., 5TH Cm. R. 34.5 (expediting appeals).

INTRAMURAL REFORMS

19951

most all costs. Furthermore, the courts of appeals should avoid spending more marginal resources in deciding when to write than in giving
each decision its writing due.
The third purpose of writing is most important because of the value
of precedent and the role stare decisis plays in our legal system. 61 A deciding panel participates in a dialogue that is both backward and forward looking, both inwardly and outwardly directed, and both
upwardly and downwardly important.63 A decision builds on past decisions and shapes future decisions. An appellate judgment decides a particular controversy and guides the resolution of later controversies. The
court of appeals reviews the district court and is reviewed, in turn, by
the Supreme Court. In all these relationships, the court of appeals must
record and communicate its reasoning to perform its essential role. An
expression of reasoning will always contribute to the body of precedent
or usefully inform the other courts, including the Supreme Court. 64
B.

Deciding Appeals without an Opinion

The received tradition always has been that litigants are entitled, as a
matter of policy, to some statement of reasons for a decision on appeal.
The courts of appeals have violated this tradition by providing for and
rendering judgments without any opinion. A Fifth Circuit "innovation," 65 the practice is anathema to the appellate ideal and the tradition
of the federal courts. 6 Avowedly never used to finesse or hide a difficult
issue, 6" an affirmance without opinion typically is authorized by local
rule if: (1) the findings of fact are not clearly erroneous; or (2) the evidence supporting the jury's verdict is not insufficient; or (3) substantial
evidence on the record as a whole supports an agency's order; and (4)
"the Court also determines that no error of law appears and an opinion
would have no precedential value. . . . "

62. See Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit,
35 Sw. L.J. 687, 712 (1981).
63. See id.at 712-13,731-34.
64. Merrill, supra note 56, at 435. The Supreme Court ishampered in the performance of
itsrole when forced to review an opinionless decision. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191,
194 n.4 (1972), vacating 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971).
65. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970).
See generally Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit:
Can Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980). The Supreme
Court, before and since, has used a similar technique to cope with its appeals docket. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.27 (6th ed. 1986).
66. BAKER, supra note *, at 14-30. See also STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS,
supranote 5, § 3.36.
67. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990, 430 F.2d at 972.
68. 5TH CIR. R. 47.6; see FED. R. APP. P. 47.
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Initially justified solely as a necessary form of self-defense against the
perceived impending threat of aFifth Circuit docket disaster, the number of affirmances-without-opinion has decreased over the years, and
the judges now seem to use the technique differently. 69 Judges in the
court of origin and in the other courts of appeals have apparently receded from their initial enthusiasm and the technique remains most useful in cases in which oral argument confirms that no issue is in doubt. In
these cases, a notice is sent to counsel after argument that for all intents
and purposes classifies the appeal as frivolous, nunc pro tunc.
Nevertheless, the appropriate accommodation of the competing interests requires some form of written opinion. Insufficient attention has
been given to what might be called the "abridged opinion," a written
opinion primarily addressed to the parties, which identifies the issue on
appeal, announces the court's disposition, and gives the principled basis
for the ruling.70 Given the narrow audience, the facts and procedural
history can be omitted.7 Less important and less complete, these opinions would naturally have less precedential impact, but not by the artifice of declaring them "nonprecedential precedents. ' 72 Standards for
nonargument calendar selection and for affirmance without opinion disposition have already been articulated. Strangely, similar criteria and a
uniform practice concerning the simple, traditional per curiam opinion
are nowhere to be found. Such a protocol and practice would provide a
"useful economy" in the majority of federal appeals." Criticisms of
long opinions come not just from the ivory tower, but from the bench
as well. For example, the late Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit challenged his fellow circuit judges to spend less time worrying about the
scholarly nature of their opinions:
American judicial opinions surpass in verbiage, in length and in
citation those written anywhere else in the world .... Occasionally
each of us may render a decision, perhaps in a highly significant case,
that demands exposition of the full palette of our talents, but I fear
that much of our time and the time of our clerks is spent merely in

69.

These trends are fully described in GEORGE K. RAHDERT & LARRY M. ROTH, APPEALS TO
ch. 2 (1991-93).
70. Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality
Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. Rav. 766, 782 (1983).
71. Id.; see also CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 22, at 33-35.
72. "1 think all I am speaking about is ...a nonprecedential precedent." HEARING BEFORE
THE CO ,M'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM 537 (2d Phase 1974-75) (testimony of Judge Robert Sprecher), quoted in William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The
Non-PrecedentialPrecedent - Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MANUAL

Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1978).

73.

Carrington, supranote 20, at 559.
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seeking felicitous expression, adding citations and attempting to
produce works of art. It would be worthwhile for judges to experiment
with much simpler opinion models. We will succeed, however, only if
we de-institutionalize the demand for scholarly opinions. A good motto
for us might be: Sufficient unto the case is the decision thereof.74
As a D.C. Circuit Judge, Ruth Bader Ginsburg likewise urged her colleagues to exercise greater restraint before writing separate opinions."
She insists that if judges exert more effort to balance collegiality and
individuality, the clarity and predictability of the law will be improved. 76
Admittedly, a shorter opinion is not always easier to write, and many
a wag has made the point.' The memorandum per curiam should be the
standard, with the scholarly exegesis saved for the truly deserving decision. The time and resources saved by this judicial self-discipline would
not be limited to the initial drafting, but would also lessen the future
efforts at drafting briefs and opinions, as well as everyone's efforts to
stay abreast of the law.
For expediency, memorandum opinions could even be dictated in
open court with only a little extra preparation in those cases in which
oral argument confirms that no issues are in doubt. 7 This procedure
might not save much time over the memorandum opinion. Yet, the Second Circuit has used the oral per curiam opinion in a useful way for
those cases in which the court is performing only a dispute resolution
function and not a law generation function. The Sixth Circuit still uses
this technique in upwards of 100 appeals each year.79 However, the Second Circuit experience is not readily transferable, because oral argument
is guaranteed in most every case and substantial central staff resources
are used to settle appeals and monitor case flow, but are not used in the

74. Rubin, Management Problems in the Federal Courts: Curbing Bureaucratization and
Reducing Other Tensions Between Justice and Efficiency, quoted in Dorothy W. Nelson, Why
Are Things Being Done This Way?, JUDGES' J., Fall 1980, at 13, 15 n.7; see also Robert Gardner, Toward Shorter Opinions, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 240 (1980); Wald, supra note 70, at 782-83.
75. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990).
76. Id. at 150. See also Sheldon Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 19651971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 635 (1973); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Styles of
Collegial Judging - One Judge's Perspective, 39 FED. B. NEws & J. 199 (1992).
77. "I have made this letter longer than usual because I lack the time to make it shorter."
BLAISE PASCAL, PROVENTiAL LETTERS at xvi, quoted in Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 986
n.22 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
78. J. Edward Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 29, 37-38 (1968). But see Goldman, supra note 22; Oakley, supra note 24.
79.

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES 78 (1990); see 6TH CIR. R. 19.
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decisional process.0 Furthermore, this Second Circuit practice reportedly has diminished markedly, and apparently for good reason. If the
appeal can be decided, even tentatively, in advance, it may be a better
candidate for the nonargument calendar. The courts of appeals should
avoid turning oral argument and opinion writing into mere facades or
empty appellate rituals. An opinion from the bench can have an embarrassing effect on the losing attorney and party, but the real problem
with this drive-through-window approach is that the decision is rendered
without the fullest judge-to-judge discussion intervening. A few seconds
of whispered asides, if they take place at all, may do more harm than
the procedure saves in terms of the appellate tradition. When an oral per
curiam is delivered, the other members of the panel may be reluctant to
suggest changes, corrections, or additions. Circulation of a written opinion allows more of an opportunity for give and take. There is greater
appellate dignity afforded the appeal and the parties.
At bottom, the process of deciding an appeal without an opinion suffers because no standard or rule effectively limits the practice to appeals
in which none of the three purposes of a written opinion is served. The
reality is that some of the courts of appeals are silently deciding appeals
that twenty years ago would have been thought to merit a full opinion. 8
The suspicion is that some appeals are being decided without an opinion
despite the legitimate expectation of the litigants, without regard to the

importance to the court of the writing process, and in spite of the lost
precedential value that results. If so, that reality is at odds with the appellate ideal and the proper concept of the role of the courts of appeals.
This is one example where the courts of appeals seem to have pursued
efficiency at too high a price. The practice deserves to be formally abolished, rather than just being allowed to fall into disuse.
C. Nonpublication andNoncitation

Whether to publish the proposed memorandum per curiam opinions
and if not, whether to allow citation to unpublished opinions are two
distinct but related questions. These are not new questions, unique to
the burdened Federal courts of appeals. As long as common law courts
have decided appeals, debate has probably persisted concerning limited
publication of opinions. In a time of docket growth, however, the rheto-

80. Michael S. Oberman, Coping with Rising Caseload:A New Model of Appellate Review,
46 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 851-52 (1980). Some court-watchers suggest that the Second Circuit does
use staff resources in the decisional process in certain categories of appeals. Two examples are
habeas corpus and prisoner petition cases. Oral argument is rare in such cases even in the Second
Circuit.
81.

Edwards, supra note 11, at 895.
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ric becomes more shrill.82 In proper perspective, the published opinion is
the centerpiece in the courts of appeals' performance of their role and
the systematic function of precedent. 3 Historically, limited publication
has been the rule both in England and in this country, with control of
selection and content in the hands of private concerns. 4 Today, West
Publishing Company routinely publishes all opinions provided under the
publication policy established in each circuit.8 " The modern issue is
whether judges should have control over the selection of opinions for
publication and citation, and, if so, by what standards should they

choose?8
Each of the circuits has its own limited publication/non citation protocol, all of which share a common purpose but vary in their particulars. 87 Limited publication means just that: the panel decides not to

82.
[U]nlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a burden and a threat to a
cohesive body of law ....
[Tihere are limits on the capacity of judges and lawyers to produce, research, and
assimilate the sheer mass of judicial opinions. Those limits are dangerously near at
present and in some systems may already be exceeded .... Common law in the United
States could be crushed by its own weight if present trends continue unabated.
Charles W. Joiner, Limiting Publication of Jud. Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195, 195-96 (1972).
83. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CH. L. REV. 573, 575-77
(1981). See generally SUSAN W. BRENNER, PRECEDENT INFLATION (1992).
84. See Burton M. Atkins, Communication of Appellate Decisions: A Multivariate Model
For Understanding the Selection of Cases for Publication, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1171 (1990)
(describing how appellate decisions are selected for publication in the English Court of Appeals).
85. Reynolds & Richman, supranote 83, at 576-77.
86. Id. at 577. Rarely will a conflict arise between court and publisher. But see United
States v. Kilpatrick, 575 F. Supp. 325 (D. Colo. 1983), cert. denied sub noma.Blondin v. Winner,
484 U.S. 1006 (1988); Stuart Taylor Jr., U.S. Obtains Curb on Judge's Attack on Justice Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1984, at Al (Justice Department obtains temporary order barring opinion
from West Publishing Co.'s Federal Supplement).
87. See generally DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUD. CTR., UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS (1985). State appellate courts have experimented with nonpublication/noncitation protocols, much to the chagrin of most commentators.
See, e.g., Harry L. Anstead, Selective Publication:Better Than Nothing at All?, 58 FLA. B.J.
651 (1984) (Florida); Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in
Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (1981) (Ohio); David M. Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall Not
be Cited as Authority": The Emerging Contours of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure90(i), 24
ST. MARY'S L.J. 115 (1992) (Texas); Edwin R. Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J.
145 (1984-85) (Kentucky).
The California Supreme Court practice of "depublication" - disposing of an appeal by an
order that an opinion of the state intermediate court not be published - is uniquely Californian
and qulite controverted. See, e.g., Paige M. Baker, Comment, Depublication: The New Starchamber, 18 W. ST. U. L. REv. 313 (1990). The closest thing to depublication in the federal
courts is the practice of vacatur, by which an appellate court vacates the judgment and opinion
of the district court, upon the motion of the parties as part of a settlement agreement. This is
common practice in the Federal Circuit, although there are some unsettled questions about the
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publish some opinions beyond communication to the litigants. Noncitation is just as literal a component of the typical protocol. Once some
opinions go unreported, the inevitable next question is whether the unpublished opinion may be cited to the court or by the court."
The circuit judges themselves do not agree on the propriety of selective publication and citations 9 Commentators likewise are divided.9

The arguments for and against the policy are telling. 9' Proponents of a
noncitation rule argue the following: (1)unpublished opinions are written for the litigants only and would require substantial refinement to
merit wider distribution; (2) if citation were permitted, a black market in
unreported opinions would develop, which would frustrate part of the

reason for nonpublication; (3) access would necessarily be unequal, as
for example, between institutional litigators who could maintain an
opinion bank and private persons; (4) properly unpublished opinions
represent mere applications of settled principles, adding nothing but volume to the stream of precedents. Opponents of a noncitation plan argue
that permitting citation is necessary to the rule of stare decisis. Today's
practice in the Federal courts of appeals decidedly follows the proponents' view that a noncitation rule is part and parcel of a limited publication plan. If the purpose of the limited publication rule is to lower the
costs of producing and consuming appellate decisions, arguably a noncitation limitation logically should follow. The more difficult question is
whether the nonpublication approach is appropriate in the first place.
Federal developments concerning nonpublication may be summarized
briefly. 92 In 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States formally

procedure. See, e.g., U.S. Phillips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
cert. dismissed, 114 S.Ct. 425 (1993). Michael W. Loudenslager, Note, Erasing the Law: The
Implicationsof Settlements Conditioned Upon Vacatur or Reversal of Judgments, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1229 (1993). See also Philip L. Dubois, The Negative Side of Jud. Decision Making:
Depublication as a Tool of Jud. Power and Administration on State Courts of Last Resort, 33
VILL. L. REV. 469 (1988); Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72 CAL. L. REV. 514 (1984).
88. See generally David L. Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of Stare Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 581 (1978); David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977).
89. Compare, e.g., RicHIARD A. POSNER, TuE FED. COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 121-23
(1985) (suggesting that any efficiencies or savings may be offset by the loss of potential precedents) and The Honorable Phillip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's
View, 35 Am. U. L. REV. 909, 916 (1986) (suggesting that the number of appeals, including the
number of unworthy appeals, makes these devices necessary).
90. Compare, e.g., Render, supra note 87 (expressing the traditional concern for lost precedents) with Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at 609 (arguing that the problem is poorly
considered rules of law, not loss of precedent).
91. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 22, at 37; STTENSTRA, supra note 87, at 5-15.
92. This summary is based on Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at 577-79. See also
STIENSTRA, supra note 87, at 5-15.

19951

INTRAMURAL REFORMS

resolved that publication would be reserved for those opinions having
"general precedential value." 93 In 1972 the Federal Judicial Center and
the Judicial Conference requested each court of appeals to develop a
limited publication/noncitation plan.' Little has changed about this arrangement since the establishment of each circuit as its own laboratory. 9
In 1978, after a period of reporting and gathering data, a subcommittee
of the Judicial Conference of the United States concluded in its final
report:
Initially [the] committee hoped that it would be possible to distill five
years of experience under eleven different circuit opinion publication
plans into one model that might be adaptable throughout the Federal
Judiciary. That desire has not been attained and perhaps at present is
unattainable ....
At this time we are unable to say that one opinion publication plan is
preferable to another, nor is there a sufficient consensus on either legal
or policy matters, to enable us to recommend a model rule. We believe
6
that continued experimentation under a variety of plans is desirable.
Since then, the larger debate over limited publication/non citation
plans has centered on three assumptions: (1) full publication is not a necessary element of the appellate function; (2) the costs of full publication
outweigh the benefits; and (3) judges can and will properly distinguish
between the publishable and the not publishableY Each of these assumptions merits closer examination.
Every appellate opinion performs double duty. As a mandate, an
opinion adds substantially to the finality of the judicial resolution of the
particular dispute between the party litigants. It represents the law of the
case. As a unit of precedent, an opinion makes law for other cases.
Some appellate decisions perform only the first and not the second duty,
or so the argument goes, when the appeal merely calls for the application of well-settled principles. In a practical way, the side one takes reflects one or another philosophy of law. On one level, courts of appeals
generate headnotes arranged under key numbers. The decision is then
catalogued under the key number for some future invocation. The prin-

93.

REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE

JUD. CONFERENCE

OF THE UNITED STATES

11

(1964).
94. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33
(1972).
95. See generally Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at578-79.
96. Report of the Subcomm. on Fed. Jurisdiction of the Comm. on Court Administration
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Opinion PublicationPlans in the United States
Courts of Appeals 10 (1978), quoted in STIENSTRA, supra note 87, at 13.
97. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at 579.
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ciple is the thing. On another level, actual applications of earlier established principles demonstrate those principles and describe their effective
content more broadly and in a more lasting way than what the opinion
expressly says. The application is the thing. How one answers the question, "Which is the real thing?" decides whether the appellate presumption ought to be for or against publication; in other words, whether full
publication is an essential aspect of deciding appeals. 98 Appellate decision making involves more than merely articulating and applying doctrine. Law, and appellate decision making as a pure form of law, is and
always will be more an art than a science. To understand fully what is
being decided and why, one must know how and why the court's political power is being exercised. The court should feel obliged to explain
itself to a candid reader.
In regard to the second assumption, the advocates of a limited publication/noncitation plan argue that the costs of full publication are so
high that selective publication is preferable. Admittedly, the resource
costs of opinion preparation are increased marginally for publication editing. Some pride of authorship is eliminated with a nonpublished, noncitable opinion. These costs are difficult to quantify, however, and seem
somewhat speculative. 99 Furthermore, the memorandum opinion device- "sufficient unto the case" -described in the previous subsection,
at least would avoid these costs, if only as a matter of judicial self-restraint.
Concerns for costs tocaptive readers and purchasers also gain the attention of nonpublication proponents.?0 Library expenses increase with
volume. Readership includes judges and courts who must apply precedents, scholars who must perform as critics, and advocates who must
advise clients and write briefs. On balance, these concerns are not convincing because the system overload is not apparently imminent, and
because unprincipled nonpublication poses a more pronounced threat to
the appellate ideal. The "flood of opinions" argument has been around

98. Id. at 579-80.
99. One empirical study of one state's nonpublication protocol concluded that the state's
judges were free to write an extra 1,465 decisions in one year, at a purported savings of over $5
million. Keith H. Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
1, 2-3 (1989). But see supra note 87 (states).
100. See Merrill, supra note 56, at 471.
We must not make the loads these captives bear an unbearable one or the system will
surely collapse. It is on the critical appraisal of the scholar that the public must largely
rely for an impersonal and knowledgeable assessment of the work of the courts. It is
upon the discriminating briefing of the lawyers that we ourselves depend. We should
strive to relieve these people from waste of time in reading that which really adds
nothing to the substance of the law.
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for decades, yet private sector accommodations and specializations continue to cope.101
Even if all the arguments in favor of nonpublication are accepted, the
practice has grave consequences for the federal appellate tradition. The
appellate ideal contemplates such a central role for the published opinion that to have a two-tracked system is to have an altogether different
system. In a profession that judges itself by the appearance of impropriety, limited publication appears at odds with accepted appellate tradition. Suspicions and accusations that judges are being less than diligent
or are giving some appeals less than their due spring to mind, if not to
reality.)0 Stare decisis is twice diminished. First, the decision itself is
freed from the responsibility to reason within full view. Second, an increment of precedent is rendered unusable. Nonpublication could allow
arbitrary and unreasonable decisions to go unnoticed and unremedied,
substituting a rule of men for a rule of law. First impressions might go
unchecked. Judging in such cases might degenerate into an administrative-style case processing. One of the major means of holding Article III
judges accountable would be lost. The parade of possible horrors
marches on and on.
Little can be said of the actual experience of the courts of appeals
with the nonpublication rules. Critics and champions alike have fought
armed only with speculations. The commentary has largely been negative, much of it intensely so.103 In 1985, the Federal Judicial Center published a study by Donna Stienstra that reviewed the history of the
nonpublication/noncitation protocols in the courts of appeals.1N° That
study explained the trade-offs courts accepted with nonpublication and
the resulting problems of assuring equitable access to unpublished opinions. It concluded that:
[A]ny combination of restrictions or freedoms with regard to

distribution and citation leads to problems for either the courts or the
bar. If both distribution and citation are restricted, unpublished
decisions may be used without acknowledgment. If distribution is
restricted while citation is permitted, those who have the resources to
find the unpublished decisions have an unfair advantage. Yet, if

101. See generally J. Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication
of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REv. 791, 795-96 (1975).
102. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at 581.
103. See, e.g., Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309 (1977); James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit'5
Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A. J. 1224 (1975); Daniel N. Hoffman,
Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JusT. Sys. J. 405 (1981); Herbert J.
Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions, 64 A.B.A. J. 1245 (1978).
104. STIENSTRA, supra note 87.
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distribution is freely made while citation is restricted, the problem of
unacknowledged use again arises. Finally, if both distribution and
citation are unrestricted, free and fair access and use are ensured, but
the savings in resources are lost. The issues in the publication debate
are complex and the choices before the courts are difficult."°
Various empirical studies have sought to evaluate how these nonpublication/noncitation protocols actually operate in the courts of appeals. A
few of their more noteworthy findings deserve to be mentioned here.
One study of the Federal Circuit found that the appellate decision is
more likely to be published if it reverses the district court.'°6 A second
study surveyed how institutional litigants, primarily government agencies, have adapted to acquire and maintain "unpublished" appellate opinions under nonpublication/noncitation protocols and therefore called
into question the fairness of such limitations for those litigants who do
not appear repeatedly in the courts of appeals.107 A third study of state
practices tried to estimate the costs of the nonpublication/noncitation
protocols in terms of the percentage of unpublished opinions that were
of precedential and publishable importance (15%) and the portion that
appeared to be poorly reasoned or deficient and hidden (1%).1 01 A
fourth study took a more philosophical and qualitative approach to discern the true status of unpublished opinions and concluded that for
most purposes they were law and should be citable.' 9 A fifth study analyzed all of the 1986 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and expressed serious doubt whether the very broad, general language of the Court's
protocol provided any meaningful guidance to the judges in determining
whether to publish an opinion. 10

105. Id. at 47; see also Donald R. Songer, Criteriafor Publicationof Opinions in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals: FormalRules Versus EmpiricalReality, 73 JUDICATURE 307 (1990).
106. Erica U. Bodwell, Published and Unpublished Federal Circuit Patent Decisions: A
Comparison, 30 IDEA 233, 241-42 (1990).
107. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940 (1989).
108. Beyler, supra note 99, at 2-3.

109.

George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Jud. Opinions, 39 MERCER

L. REV. 477 (1988).
Unpublished decisions are law as much as are published decisions for dispute settling

purposes. The application of the doctrines of res judicata, law of the case, and collateral estoppel to unpublished opinions assures their capacity to settle disputes. But unpublished opinions, because of their lack of promulgation, are not precedents. They
are not fit subjects for the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Yet, because the
reasoning found in unpublished decisions may be useful in establishing the law, their
citation should be allowed for that purpose.
Id. at 493.
110. Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit:An Empirical Analy-

sis, 16 FLA. Sr. U. L. REv. 963, 984 (1989).
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An article published in 1981 stands out, however, for having evaluated the nonpublication/noncitation protocols in terms of the federal
appellate tradition and ideal and thus merits further attention here. Professors Reynolds and Richman attempted an empirical assessment of the
various nonpublication plans in the courts of appeals."' Expected benefits from the nonpublication/ noncitation plans included swifter justice
and increased productivity. The study found that appeals decided with
unpublished opinions were resolved much more quickly, although Professors Reynolds and Richman found it impossible to determine just
how much of the time saved was attributable to the nonpublication designation and how much was the simple result of less judicial effort required for these less difficult decisions.1 2 While their study found no
support for the hypothesis that limited publication enhances productivity, the researchers were careful to explain that any conclusion on productivity was impossible because of the number of variables that
affected judicial output." 3
The study focused on two costs of nonpublication: diminished opinion quality and suppression of precedent. The study divided all of opinion writing into three parts: reasoned opinions, decisions based on the
opinion below, and decisions without discernible justification."14 At minimum, the principal investigators preferred an opinion that identified the
appeal and went on to declare and give reasons for the ultimate result.
Although most of the unpublished opinions did this, the authors were
somewhat critical of decisions that merely referenced a trial court opinion. The decision-by-reference was criticized because of the lack of access by those not parties to the litigation and the appearance that the
decision on appeal was merely a rubber stamp. ' These criticisms are
not persuasive. Unpublished opinions are not designed to serve a constituency beyond the actual litigants, and a "reasoned opinion" that
merely parrots the opinion below would do little to dissuade the extreme
cynic. The third category, decisions with no discernable justifications,
marks only a difference in opinion typology (is this word correct?) between the present author and Professors Reynolds and Richman. They
criticized the nonpublication plans for including the option to decide an
appeal without an opinion previously discussed and rejected here. Certainly, the ad hoc use of the boilerplate opinion that recites simply "af11. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83; see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 72;
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DuKE L.J. 807.
112. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at 593-95.
113. See id. at 595-97.
114. See id. at 599-604.
115.

See id.
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ter due consideration" or "upon a review of the record and the briefs of
the parties" is no better than the formal provisions that allow for a one
word judgment "affirmed." Those are not unpublished opinions, however, not because they are not published, but because they are not opinions.
The second cost Professors Reynolds and Richman addressed was the
opinion that should have been published but was not, that is, the problem of suppressed precedent." 6 Although they did not discover widespread suppression of precedent, the authors found opinions they
concluded should have been published. Examples of such holdings included novel state law questions, defective administration by an agency,
inadequacies of national statutes, and district court mistakes." 7 Additionally, they suggested that nonpublication was inappropriate, although
actually rare, when judges articulated concurring or dissenting opinions
or when the judgment was reversed.""8
On balance, Professors Reynolds and Richman concluded that the
suppressed precedent is less significant a problem than what they called
the "shoddy" opinion." 9 Their ultimate conclusion that any proposed
rule must maximize the "benefits of limited publication while avoiding
as many of its costs as possible'"1 is the correct one. Their intermediate
reasoning, however, is not fully persuasive. Although a satisfactory
method for selecting which opinions to publish may not exist, the present patchwork system is unsatisfactory and has been tolerated too long.
Standards are necessary. Both the Advisory Council on Appellate
Justice' 2 ' and the American Bar Association Commission on Standards

116. See id. at 606-21.
117. Id. at 606-12.
118. See id. at 612-20.
119. Seeid. at 621.
120. Id. at 626.
121. At the behest of the Federal Judicial Center, a group of lawyers, law teachers, and
judges joined with the National Center for State Courts to form the Council, which promulgated
standards for the publication decision:

1. Standard for Publication

2.

An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not be designated for publication unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies an existing
rule; or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in section (1)
of this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only if the majority opinion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the dissenting
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of Judicial Administration have drafted model rules. Since 1978 the
courts of appeals have been left to their own devices. The time has come
for rigorous evaluation and adoption of a single uniform national standard. The variety of existing rules provides a menu, and experience under them provides a data base. An optimum uniform rule would create a
presumption in favor of publication and would require that a nonpublication choice be panel-unanimous. It would also list an objective set of
criteria for mandatory publication. The specifics of the proposal are left
to other drafters. 12

judge determines that a standard for publication as set out in section (1) of this
rule is satisfied. The (highest court) may order any unpublished opinion of the
(intermediate court) or a concurring or dissenting opinion in that court published.
3. If the standard for publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied as to
only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published.
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not to
publish an opinion in the case at the conference on the case before or at the time
the writing assignment is made, and at the time, if appropriate, they shall make a
tentative decision not to publish.
COMM.

ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE,

STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUD. OPINIONS, quoted in Walther, supra note 88, at 582 n.7.

122. See REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, 130 (Apr. 2, 1990). Although their
proposal is not without its flaws, Professors Reynolds and Richman have developed a model rule
that also merits consideration:
Rule

_.

Opinions.

I. Minimum Standards:
Every decision will be accompanied by an opinion that sufficiently states the facts
of the case, its procedural stance and history, and the relevant legal authority so
that the basis for the disposition can be understood from the opinion and the
authority cited.
2.

Publication of Opinions:
a. Criteria for Publication: An opinion will be published if it:
(1) establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of
law, or calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have
been generally overlooked;
(2) applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from
those in previous applications of the rule;
(3) explains, criticizes, or reviews the history, application, or administration
of existing decisional or enacted law;
(4) creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within the circuit or between this circuit and another;
(5) concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of significant public
interest;
(6) is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion;
(7) reverses the decision below, unless:
(a) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or
(b) the reversal is a remand (without further comment) to the district
court of a case reversed or remanded by the Supreme Court;
(8) addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision that has been
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CASE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

As part of their response to caseload pressures, several courts of appeals have experimented with civil appeals management plans, often acronymically known as CAMP.123 Although these plans differed in their
particulars, they had common goals, albeit with varying emphases: (1)
encouraging the resolution of appeals without court action; (2) accelerating the consideration and disposition of those appeals that go to argument; (3) clarifying the issues and improving the quality of briefs and
arguments- and (4) resolving motions and procedural matters informally
and expeditiously.124 Techniques include appeal tracking forms that allow processing to begin before filing of the record on appeal and briefs,
staff monitoring and adjustments of the briefing schedule, case weighing
and early assignment to panels and, most importantly, a prehearing conference.121
The prehearing conference typically takes place before briefing. A
staff attorney usually administers the conference. It is attended by attorneys for both sides who discuss the issues on appeal, freely and in confi-

published; or
is an opinion in a disposition that
(a) has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, or
(b) is a remand of a case from the United States Supreme Court.
Publication Decision: There shall be a presumption in favor of publication.
An opinion shall be published unless each member of the panel deciding the
case determines that it fails to meet the criteria for publication.
3. The court recognizes that the decision of a case without oral argument and without publication is a substantial abbreviation of the traditional appellate process
and will employ both devices in a single case only when the appeal is patently
frivolous.
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 83, at 626-28 (citations omitted). See also Hon. Bruce M.
Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the Information Age, 55
OHIo ST. L.J. 405 (1994).
123. See generally Jerry Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in
Appellate ProceduralReform, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978); Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every
Appeal Run the Gamut? - The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755 (1986);
Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Jud. Reform: Time as the Greatest
Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253 (1988); Irving R. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference:
A n Appellate ProceduralReform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1974).
124. Plans were implemented and evaluated in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits. See JAMES B. EAGUN, FED. JUr. CTR., Tm P E-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS (1990); LARRY C. FARMER, FED. JUD. CTR.,
APPEALS EXPEDITING SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF SECOND & EIGHTH CIRCUIT PROCEDURES
(1981); JERRY GOLDMAN, FED. JuD. CTR., THt SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREAPPEAL PROGRAM: AN
EVALUATtON (1982); Pamela Mathy, Experimentation in Federal Appellate Case Management
and the PrehearingConference Program of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, 61 CHi.-KENT L. Rav. 431 (1985); Robert W. Rack, Jr., Pre-Argument Conferences in
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 U. ToL. L. REV. 921 (1984). Cf. FED. R. APe. P. 33
(providing for a prehearing conference at the Court's direction).
125. See generally GOLDMAN, supranote 124.
(9)
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dence from the judges. 1 During that conference, the staff attorney
explores the possibility of a nonjudicial resolution, develops possible stipulations, narrows the issues, and attempts to anticipate and resolve any
procedural issues by agreement, such as a request for a stay or a dispute
about the content of the joint appendix. Although encouragement of a
nonjudicial resolution, achieving a settlement, is the main emphasis,
other features of the case management plans advance those appeals that
do not in fact settle.
Because the regional courts of appeals have developed separate and
individual approaches, the feasibility and effectiveness of case management plans that use a prehearing conference as a principal mechanism
must be considered circuit by circuit.2 7 Two considerations dominate the
evaluation.121 First, in a court with a backlog of cases awaiting argument, attorney readiness need not be accelerated, although enhancement
of presentation quality still remains important. The prospect of long delay in those courts of appeals may in fact increase settlement pressures
although no studies have been done. Second, geography becomes a severe logistical problem in larger circuits because of the difficulty in arranging face-to-face conferences. Distances and expenses have been
overcome, however, by telephone conferencing in some circuits't 9 and it
0
has been suggested that staff attorneys might "ride circuit." 13
Circuit-by-circuit evaluations suggest some positive consequences of
case management plans.' Plans characterized by a prehearing conference reduced the number of motions the judges had to decide, shortened

126. See generally ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & ALLAN LIND, FED. JUD. CTR., A REEVALUATION
OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAr (1983). In June 1993, the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure recommended an amendment to FED. R. APP. P. 33 to the Jud.
Conference of the United States. The amendment would authorize appeal conferences, presided
over by a judge or other designated person, to address any matter that might aid the disposition
of the appeal or might simplify the issues for decision, as well as the possibility of settlement.
127. In some circuits, modern internal operating procedures of courts of appeals without
formal plans and conferences do include monitoring and facilitating by central court staff. See
Don Johnson, Time Delays in the Fifth Circuit - From Docketing to Decision - Civil and
Criminal Cases, 2 FIFTH CIR. REP. 345 (1985).
128. PARTRIDGE & LIND, supra note 126, at 10-11.
129. EAGLIN, supra note 124, at 41.
130. PARTRIDGE & LIND, supranote 126, at 10.

131. See generally EAOLiN, supra note 124, at 5-9 (Sixth Circuit); GOLDMAN, supra note 124,
at 42-43 (Seventh Circuit); PARTRIDGE & LIND, supra note 126, at 10-11 (Second Circuit). CAMP
procedures must be distinguished from two alternative approaches: the bygone view of treating
every appeal alike and the summary calendar system already discussed. CAMP has both
strengths and weaknesses. Volume continues to exert pressure. Many cases are treated very peremptorily in a CAMP circuit under heavy docket pressure. A staff attorney handling the conference might not always review the record and carefully study the issues. Under the summary
calendar approach, the judges seem to be more in control.
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the joint appendix, reduced the delay between briefing and argument,
and reduced the overall time from notice of appeal to termination. Although briefs were not significantly shorter, there was a general impression that their quality improved. Interestingly, the impact on the
settlement rate is unclear. In the experience of some circuits the plan had
a substantial effect on the settlement rates, and in others no substantial
differences were discernible.13 The literature on the plans generally concludes that their benefits outweigh their costs even without considering
the effect on settlement rates; but their long-term potential and ultimate
justification most assuredly will rest on settlement impact.
A Federal Judicial Center study of the pre-argument conference program in the Sixth Circuit, published in 1990, concluded as follows: (1)
these programs do result in cases being settled that would otherwise proceed through the full appellate procedure; (2) those appeals that do not
settle often are rendered more manageable through simplification and
clarification of the issues; (3) appellate delay and expense are reduced;
(4) the practicing bar has come to value the program; and (5) telephone
conferencing can be a viable alternative to more costly and more difficult to arrange in-person conferences.' 33 The study estimated that the
Sixth Circuit conferencing plan was reducing the overall annual workload of that court by a factor of 1.06 judges.1 4 According to another
study, the Eighth Circuit's program concentrates on settlement and relies on voluntary telephone and personal conferences to achieve that
goal in more than one hundred appeals each year. 3' The full long-term
potential of improving the likelihood of settlement remains uncertain
and merits further evaluation and study. 3 6 This task will be difficult,
but developing a profile of the appeal with a high probability of settlement is a worthy endeavor.3 7 Scarce resources and extra efforts could
then be spent more judiciously than in an approach that treated all appeals as fungible, for that is the objection that launched these experiments in the first place." '8
132. See Rack, supra note 124, at 934 ("a substantial number of settlements"). Compare
GOLDMAN, supra note 124, at 42-43 (Seventh Circuit - no difference) with PARTRIDGE & LIND,
supra note 126, at 10-I1 (Second Circuit - substantial difference).
133. EAGLIN, supra note 124, at 41-42.
134. Id. at30-31.
135. See John H. Martin, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Pre-Argument Conference Program, 69 JUDICATURE 312 (1986).
136.
AMERICAN BAR Assoc., STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUD. IMPROVEMENTS, THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY

OF GROWTH 38-39 (1989) [hereinafter A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE].
137. "After trying for almost a year to select cases with high settlement potential, the [Sixth
Circuit] program staff could discern no factors reliably predictive of settlement....'" Rack,
supra note 124, at 926.
138. See AMERICAN BAR Assoc., JUD. ADMINISTRATION DIVISION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
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Finally, the point should be made that these case management programs have an assumption in common with screening protocols for the
nonargument summary calendar, discussed above. The assumption
again is that all appeals are not fungible. The idea is that an early investment of resources to evaluate and sort appeals by categories and then
assign them to different procedural tracks is justified by qualitative differences in appeals and will save scarce judicial resources in the long
run. By comparison, it seems that summary calendar screening techniques today are more refined and have developed more judicial confidence than settlement programs. Both might be enhanced if each was
understood as a variation on the same theme. There needs to be greater
coherence and coordination in the administration of these two related
programs, within the circuits and among circuits.
VI.

STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS

As one barometer of change in the federal judicial institution, consider that over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, when dockets exploded, the number of support personnel nearly tripled. 13 9 These trends
continued unabated in the decade of the 1980s.140 Support personnel in
the offices of the clerks of court and in the judge's chambers represent
the first line of defense against oppressive dockets. The actual manage4
ment of an appeal involves a number of people in the clerk's office.' '
Court reporter management schemes call for day-to-day management
and supervision of an efficient court reporting service. The case manager
handles all case management functions from docketing to final issuance
of the mandate. Staff attorneys conduct prescreening assessments of the
appeals. Administering oral argument, filing, word processing, handling
the voluminous mail, and library maintenance, all demand substantial
personnel resources. Circuit executives and their staffs facilitate nonjudicial responsibilities of the court. 142 In chambers, law clerks and secretar-

APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION Standard 3.50 (1988) (endorsing the general principle of appellate

case management). See also Griffin B. Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System,
54 JUDICATURE 237 (1971).
139. David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of FederalDistrict Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 144 (1981). Judicial personnel,
both article III and article 1, also have increased dramatically.
140. Jonathan P. Nase, The Growth of the FederalJud. Labor Force: A Budget-Based Per-

spective, 70 JUDICATURE 157, 157 (1986). "An analysis of the budget of the federal judiciary
indicates that both court staffs and court system administrative structures have grown substantially. These developments have important costs and benefits, and careful analysis should precede a decision to expand the judiciary's labor force further." Id.
141. The position names change, but the responsibilities are the same, from circuit to circuit.
Fifth Circuit terms will be employed here. See generally Johnson, supra note 127, at 246-50.
142. See JOHN W. MACY, JR., FED. JUD. CTR., THE FIRsT DECADE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
EXECUTIVE: AN EVALUATION (1985).
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ies aid the judge. The appellate court family is large, indeed. For
purposes of this discussion, administrative personnel will be distinguished from decisional personnel. While commentators have largely ignored the former group, 143 the latter group, made up of staff attorneys
and law clerks, has received a fair amount of attention because of its
direct involvement in the decisionmaking process. Two related responses
to the press of heavier caseloads have been to provide judges with more
law clerks and to delegate some judicial responsibilities to staff attorneys. During the docket crisis, both law clerks and staff attorneys have
assumed a greater prominence. 144
Much has been written about the origins and development of the law
clerk from clerical assistant to an institution in itself. 14 The experience
in the federal courts of appeals may be briefly described.'" Until relatively recently, each circuit judge had only one law clerk whose role was
"testing the judge's work" by criticizing opinion drafts and arguments,
and acting generally as a sounding board. 147 Second and third law clerks
were added as in-chambers assistants and central staff attorney positions
were established and their ranks enlarged. Today's ratio of authorized
decisional personnel to circuit judges is approximately four to one, a
dramatic increase from the 1969 level of about one to one.' An appellate judge's principal efforts take place in chambers: reading briefs,

143. See generally Edward D. Re, The Administration of Justice and the Courts, 18 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 1 (1984); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension
Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOIRE DAME LAW. 648, 654 (1980).
144. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 69-

70 (1981) [hereinafter 1981

JUD. CONFERENCE REPORTS)

(the number of staff attorneys was lim-

ited to the number of judges on the court). Compare Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 509, 46 Stat. 774
(repealed 1969) (providing a law clerk for each court of appeals judge) with 28 U.S.C. § 712
(1948) (providing for appointment of "necessary law clerks"). Two law clerks per judge were
authorized in 1969 and a third in 1979. See Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-153, 83 Stat.
403; Act of Sept. 24, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-68, 93 Stat. 416, 428. There is some administrative
adjustment to allow chief judges extra staff. See infra note 174.
145. See generally JOHN B. OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUD.
PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN COURTS

(1980); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1973);
Chester A. Newland, PersonalAssistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L.
REv. 299 (1961); Eugene A. Wright, Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law
Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (1973). Not all of the commentary has been complimentary. See
e.g. John G. Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, 9 LITIG. 20 (1983); J. Daniel Mahoney, Law
Clerks: for Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 321, 337 (1988); see also Heather BuppHabuda, Law Clerk's Ethical Boundaries,38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 213 (1991).
146. For a consideration of comparable state court developments, see generally DANIEL J.
MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS - STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 31-137 (1974).
147. McCree, supra note 44, at 786-87.
148. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Jud. Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 767
(1983).
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studying records, considering arguments, deciding, and writing opinions. Judging is deciding; that is the exercise of the Article III power.
There is no denying, however, that both the role and the influence of the
law clerk in the decisional process have grown dramatically and that this
increased delegation has been primarily the result of the growth in the
caseload. Otherwise, the circuit judges would not be so preoccupied with
recruiting and selecting the best and the brightest prospects. 4 9
The worry of several commentators is that the law clerk's role in the
reading, studying, considering, and writing has encroached significantly
on that of the judge.'s Most certainly, practices vary from chambers to
chambers, and within a particular chamber from case to case. Judges
have responded generally to argue that the opinion writing process demands some trade-off among functions. 5' They explain that the core
function-the actual deciding-still resides with the judge, but that it
has been necessary to delegate more and more of the opinion preparation function to the law clerk. The workload, they contend, has forever
changed the respective roles of clerk and judge. Judges decide the result
and sketch a rationale. Law clerks prepare a draft opinion. Judges edit
the draft. In all honesty, this has become the federal appellate paradigm. 5 2 Appellate judges have joined the ranks of "senior partners,
high government officials, and professors" who "scrupulously review
and edit" the preliminary work of their junior associates.5 3 What is
most troublesome about this new order, however, is that supervision
and delegation are in inverse proportion.'54 The workload has dramatically changed the relationship between judge and law clerk, at least in
most chambers. Thus, once again, a particular response to workload has
taken the courts of appeals that much further away from the appellate
ideal and the received tradition.
A return to the days of one law clerk, having a negligible role, is not
feasible. By one judge's own estimate, an able judge single-handedly re-

149.

See generally Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707 (1991);

Abner J. Mikva, Jud. Clerkships: A Judge's View, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 150 (1986); Trenton H.
Norris, The Jud. Clerkship Selection Process: An Applicant's Perspective on Bad Apples, Sour
Grapes, and Fruitful Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 765 (1993); Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N.
Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to the BadApple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097 (1992); Patricia M.
Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152 (1990).

150. See McCree, supra note 44, at 785-87; Vining, supra note 54, at 252-53.
151.
See Ruth B. Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 217-18
(1985); Posner, supra note 148, at 769; Wald, supra note 70, at 778.
152. Robel, supra note i, at 41 n.158; see Mahoney, supra note 145, at 332-34; Posner,

supra note 148, at 769; Wald, supra note 70, at 778.
153. See Wald, supra note 70, at 778.
154. Supervising and coordinating a tripled staff of assistants necessarily places additional
demands on judicial resources. Posner, supra note 148, at 767-68.
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searching and writing each opinion could produce a dozen or so opinions a year, and the courts of appeals quickly would be overrun.' 55 The
increases in number of clerks should, however, be halted. Although the
limits of delegation and supervision may not have been surpassed in all
chambers, they have certainly been reached in most. 56 Multiplying judicial clerkships any more would jeopardize the tradition that federal
judges are respected and respectful because they do their own work.5 7
Even defenders of law clerks admit that increasing the number of law
clerks would result in diminishing marginal returns. The judge who remains a judge becomes something of a bottleneck as appeals move
through the chambers only as fast as the judge can review, evaluate, and

act on recommendations and drafts.' 58 Staff attorneys, as an alternative,
work for the court as a whole rather than for an individual judge. There
is something of a paradox in this arrangement, however. 5 9 Unless the

155. See Wald, supra note 70, at 777. Even outside Judge Wald's District of Columbia Circuit, with its purportedly large and complex cases, judicial output could not be expected to be
much higher.
Consistent with the overall effort in this Article to question contemporary assumptions, the
word "purportedly" in the preceding sentence needs explanation. While the District of Columbia's docket is relatively unique, given its jurisdiction over the seat of Government and the consequent additional administrative agency reviews, some court insiders are skeptical of the
Circuit's often-repeated claim of a burdensome and disproportionate number of large and complex appeals. The jurisdictional fact is that the relevant size and complexity of administrative
appeals is subject to exaggeration. Of course, the records on appeals are large and the procedural
histories are long in these appeals, but the court of appeals is not reviewing the administrative
record de novo. One might alternatively conclude from perusing the length of many of its opinions and the number of separate opinions in administrative appeals, that the District of Columbia Circuit is not overworked, relative to other circuits.
The available statistics likewise do not seem to bear out the often-repeated claim of an extraordinary docket burden from administrative agency appeals. In the year ending June 30,
1990, the District of Columbia Circuit decided 172 administrative agency appeals, ranking second among the circuits; the Ninth Circuit had the highest total of 177; the First Circuit had the
lowest total of 31; the per circuit average was 100.25 administrative agency appeals. For the
interval from the filing of the last brief to hearing or submission, the District of Columbia Circuit's figure of 1.5 months ranked fourth among the circuits; the national median was 3.1
months. For the interval from hearing to final disposition, the District of Columbia Circuit's
figure of 2.0 months ranked fourth among the circuits; the national median was 2.6 months. For
the interval from submission in non-argued cases until final disposition, the District of Columbia's figure of 0.5 month ranked tied-for-first among the circuits; the national median was 1.1

months.

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS Table B4 at 120 (1990). The least that can be said is that the court of appeals for
the District of Columbia is not falling behind in its effort to cope with the administrative agency
appeals on its docket.
156. "In any event, it seems to me undesirable that we move beyond three clerks." McCree,
supra note 44, at 787; see also Kester, supranote 145, at 62.
157. CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, WHEREAS - A JUDGE'S PREMIsEs 61 (1965).
158. See Timothy E. Gammon, The Central Staff Attorneys' Office in the United States
Courtof Appeals, Eighth Circuit - A Five Year Report, 29 S.D. L. REv. 457, 457 (1984).
159. See Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth
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staff attorneys are doing work that otherwise would be done by judges,
they do not increase the overall productivity of the court. Yet, if they do
perform some of the judge's duties, the judicial function is usurped. The
philosophical resolution of this paradox assigns to staff attorneys tasks
that in the past have been, but need not be, performed by judges.16
Such a resolution, however, is not easily accomplished. The various
courts of appeals have experimented with the job description of the staff
attorney. Many of the results of these experiments represent uncomfortable choices made in the face of the daunting workload. 61 One judge
explains that it is the staff attorney who
acquires a case at the moment the notice of appeal is filed, shepherds it
through each procedural step until the closing brief is in, prepares legal
memoranda, drafts a proposed opinion or other disposition,
recommends grant or denial of oral argument, and
presents the
6
complete package to the judges to be graded pass/fail. 1
The key assumption here is that these tasks need not be performed by
judges. The motions process, for example, no longer simply sends along
the matter for judicial consideration and action. Before the motion
reaches a judge, a staff attorney writes a memorandum recommending a
disposition and attaches a proposed order. 63 Admittedly, these staff attorney evaluations save a substantial amount of judge time. Deciding
whether a case deserves oral argument and how a case should be decided, however, lie at the core of the judicial function. The major concern frequently expressed is that the widespread dependence on staff
attorneys has created a bureaucratic judicial process? 64
The premise of the staff attorney position is that one staff attorney
does the work of three law clerks, one in each panel member's chambers. 165 The number of staff attorneys and their duties vary considerably

Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REv. 937, 940-41 (1980). See generally Gammon, supra note 158; Donald P.
Ubell, Report on CentralStaff Attorneys' Offices in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87

F.R.D. 253 (1980).
160.

See Hellman, supra note 159, at 940-41.

161.

For a circuit-by-circuit review, see generally Ubell, supra note 159.

162.
(1975).
163.
164.

Shirley M. Hufstedler, The Appellate Process Inside Out, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 20, 22
See Hellman, supra note 156, at 944.
See McCree, supranote 44, at 788.

There is a hidden potential danger from delegation to the central staff attorney, which arguably poses a still greater threat to the appellate ideal. Delegation and over reliance on the work of
central staff attorneys may result in an atrophy in the function of collegial judicial decisionmaking that lies at the heart of appellate procedure. See generally Robert S. Thompson, Mitigating
the Damage - One Judge and No JudgeAppellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476 (1975).

165.

See Ubell, supra note 159, at 263; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 628-29.
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from circuit to circuit. I6 Critics of the general expansion of central staff
attorney responsibilities echo the concerns expressed about the expansion of law clerk responsibility in chambers. Both types of legal assistants potentially encroach on the judging responsibility, but the situation
is worse with the staff attorney because the supervision characteristic of
the in-chambers relationship with the "elbow" law clerk is lacking for
the central staff attorney. 67 Proponents, on the other hand, maintain
that the harsh reality of caseload pressures prevents judges from doing
everything they once did. Staff attorneys perform tasks low on the judicial scale, thus allowing judges to perform the important appellate tasks
that require an Article III decisionmaker. Conceding this much departure from appellate traditions, proponents assert that, on balance, the
wise use of central staff attorneys does more good than harm.'6 Staff
attorneys in most circuits play a prominent role in handling pro se appeals. In some appeals, staff attorneys may be performing the work that
the advocates rightly ought to have done, but for whatever reason was
not done or was not done adequately. Considered realistically, the capacity reform of central staff attorneys already has lasted too long to be
deemed merely an experiment and today is an integral part of the appellate scene:
Central staff attorneys are here to stay, without question. The reasons
that gave birth to their existence remain. Filings continue to increase
and the prospect for new judgeships is limited by political and
economic reality. The only way to deal with that workload is to find

more efficient ways to operate so that a judge's productivity may be
increased. i6
While nearly everyone agrees that law clerks are necessary, there still is
considerable disagreement over their proper role. 170 The A.B.A. Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, for example, recently urged
that if staff decisional personnel were inevitable, they should be made a

166.
167.

Robel, supra note 1, at 42.

See Posner, supra note 148, at 775; Wald, supra note 70, at 778-79. See generally James
Duke Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 UCLA L. REV. 465,

479 (1976).
168. See Gammon, supra note 158, at 464; Hellman, supra note 159, at 1003.
169. Donald P. Ubell, Evolution and Role of Appellate Court Central Staff Attorneys, 2
CooLEy L. REv. 157, 166 (1984); see also David J. Brown, Facing the Monster in the Judicial

Closet: Rebutting a Presumption of Sloth, 75 JUDICATURE 291 (1992); Joseph R. Weisberger, A
Profile of Appellate Staff, JUDGES' J., Summer 1985, at 31, 32-3.

170.

David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships with Their Judges, 69 JUDi-

CATuRE 236, 237-38 (1986).
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formal and public part of the process so7 that the attorneys could review
and respond to staff recommendations. 1
Judges have gone to great lengths to defend the level of delegation
that already has taken place. 7 2 Every study has concluded that the increases in law clerks over the years have "helped the circuit courts deal
with the increasing volume of appeals without sacrificing the fundamental imperatives of appellate justice."'17 The proponents of further expanded use of staff attorneys and law clerks, however, rest their
arguments on an unstable foundation. With three law clerks and one
staff attorney for each appeals judge, the judges are at the limit of their
ability to supervise subordinate decisional personnel. 74 Until recently,
this was the official position of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. The Judicial Conference had adopted guidelines in 1981 limiting
the number of central staff attorneys in a circuit to the number of active
judgeships authorized for that court. Then, in 1991, the Judicial Conference revisited the issue of limiting staff attorneys and adopted a more
complex mathematical ratio for increasing the number of staff attorney
positions in relation to the number of authorized judgeships, based on
the computation of case filings in the court of appeals divided by full
time equivalents of judgeships. '7Thus, adding more law clerks or more
staff attorneys to the current deployment of decisional personnel no
longer is as acceptable a method of coping with the caseload. Certainly,

171. A.B.A. STANDING COM ITTEE, supra note 136, at 36-38. See also Thompson & Oakley,
supra note 21, at 68-78.
172. See supra note 145.
173. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1,at 637 (citing Commission on Revision, supra note
4, at 260-62; Steven Flanders & Jerry Goldman, Screening Practices and the Use of Para-Jud.
Personnelin a U.S. Court of Appeals: A Study in the Fourth Circuit, JUST. SYS. J., March 1975,
at 1, 13-14; ROBERT BANTA, FED. JUD. CTR., CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 5 (1978); and Ubell, supra note 159, at 307); see also DONNA STIENSTRA &
JOE S. CEcIL, FED. JUD. CTR., THE ROLE OF STAFF ATTORNEYS AND FACE-TO-FACE CONFERENCIN, N NON-ARGUMENT DECISIONMAKING (1989).
174. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 22, at 48 (arguing that two law clerks and one
central staff attorney should be the limit).
175. 1981 JUD. CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 144, at 69; REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF TE JUD. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 63 (1991); see also STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 5, Standard 3.62. Such limitations serve other ends as well: meeting fiscal limitations; respecting relations with Congress; and achieving parity among the circuits. In some of the larger circuits, which lately have resisted the creation of additional
judgeships for various reasons, the number of staff attorneys was allowed to exceed the number
of active judges, but was limited by the number of hypothetical judgeships the court would have
been authorized under the Administrative Office's formula. The 1991 formula authorizes the
total sum of the number of baseline positions, plus the dividend of the projected filings minus
base filings, over the base number of filings per full-time equivalents. This allocation is subject
to budgetary restrictions and is administered by the Administrative Office. The Judicial Conference has agreed to reevaluate the formula in five years.

950

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:913

if not exceeded, limits have been reached for decisional staff in the
courts of appeals.
So far it has been established that law clerks have multiplied to the
limit of the capacity of a circuit judge in chambers to supervise them
adequately. Likewise, the judges' own concern for the adequacy of their
supervision of central staff attorneys has resulted in Judicial Conference
limits on the staffing ratio. What is left to be done, besides giving
law
76
clerks their own para-judicial assistant-a law clerk's law clerk?
Why not consider following the established practice of most nisi prius
courts to allow the prevailing party's attorney to "draft the court's order"? At first blush, this may seem far-fetched, but district judges have
long followed this practice without untoward results and the procedure
has been upheld on appeal."7 If the hearing panel is unanimous and
sufficiently confident in its decision, arguably the opinion is merely a
matter of drafting detail that in a less important appeal could be delegated to the prevailing attorney, at the oral argument. It could be outlined orally from the bench, with a short deadline, perhaps with a page
limitation, with a requirement for service to opposing counsel and an
opportunity for an equally brief and quick response. 78 This "ghostwriting" proposal has the benefit of adding to the writing productivity of
the court without adding costly additional staff who would require ongoing supervision.
The obvious concerns with this proposal may be briefly stated. First,
an appellate court performs a function very different from a trial court;
an appellate opinion has a larger, more important lawmaking function.
District courts do not write primarily for precedent and their decisions,
by definition, are subject to one review of right in the courts of appeals.
Decisions by the courts of appeals, more often than not, are not reviewed further. Second, the potential for overreaching by an advocate
primed to decide in favor of the particular client and motivated to salt
away language in the law books for future clients and cases likely would
be too great to resist and would prove difficult to police. In short, this
"ghostwriting" proposal may be one idea that is not worth the trouble,

176. A past Solicitor General, in fact, suggested that programs be developed so that law
student interns could provide "research assistance capacity and fill the more prosaic, yet important, responsibilities of cite-checking and the like." Starr, supra note 29, at 7. These student
extern programs are widespread and well-developed in many parts of the country. See generally
OAKLEY & THoMPsoN, supra note 145, at 27-29. It is not unusual to find several law students
working in some circuit judges' chambers.
177. See In re Dixie Broadcasting, Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1029-30 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Colony Square, 819 F.2d 272 (11th Cir. 1987).

178.

See Cornelius J. Moynihan, Jr., Ghostwritersin the Courts, LITIG. Spring 1991, at 37.

See also A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7) (1990).
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which may explain why this trial court practice has not spread to appellate courts thus far.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Examining all these intramural reforms leaves the distinct impression
that Learned Hand was not describing this generation of circuit judges
when he observed that federal judges were "curiously timid about innovations."""9 Contemporary courts of appeals, with the grim determination of those under siege, have proved willing to embrace a remarkable
variety of reforms and expediencies in the face of the docket threat.
Their willingness to experiment, both for temporary expediency and for
long-term improvement, quite literally has kept the courts of appeals
from being buried in cases. But what of the worry that these expediencies, individually and collectively, have moved the courts of appeals further and further away from the appellate ideal? After summarizing these
myriad intramural reforms, the Federal Courts Study Committee offered small comfort to those who share this worry:
Many worry that these palliatives threaten the appellate ideal of
individual attention to individual cases. Without them, however, the
appellate courts would be in serious difficulty, rather than current, as
now. More changes are probably inevitable .... 11o
Stop to consider the implications from workload and the overall impact of the coping mechanisms of intramural reforms. There are approximately 250 working days in a calendar year. In 1990, there were
40,898 appeals decided, a ratio of 247 per judge or nearly one per day.
But more significantly these figures yield a ratio of 787 appeals per
three-judge panel or a little more than three appeals "decided" every
working day. And there are numerous other demands on a circuit judge
that regularly compete for daily time and attention. 81 Are there three

179.

Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
155, 158 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
180. REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 114 (Apr. 2, 1990).
181. A Tenth Circuit Judge made this point:
I must read, or otherwise be responsible for, approximately 500 pages of legal material
each day. That is nearly the equivalent of one of the less ambitious Tolstoy novels,
although legal writing does not always read so easily. I must decide approximately 400
cases a year - more than one every day, including weekends and federal holidays.
Each week I must write at least one full-length written opinion and several shorter
opinions or unpublished orders or judgments. On top of that, add a daily diet of
reviewing motions and emergency matters, work on judicial committees, preparing for
an occasional speech or moot court argument, and the like, and you have a pretty full
day.
David M. Ebel, Why and To Whom Do ConstitutionalMeta- Theorists Write? - A Response to
ProfessorLevinson, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (1992).
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meaningful votes cast in every federal appeal today? These ratios imply
that a great deal of what today passes for merits participations by the
individual circuit judge can only amount to rubber-stamping the work
of a colleague, as opposed to the more traditional full participation in
collegial decisionmaking. Various intramural reforms, in particular the
nonargument summary calendar with the attendant reliance on staff attorney work product, make these totals humanly possible.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the courts of appeals already
are rationing appellate justice under the regime of intramural reforms
described in this Article. This is not necessarily improper, of course, for
"[e]qual justice does not require equal time for all appeals, but it does
entitle the parties to the attention of a panel of judges, at least in proportion to the merit of their arguments." 81 2 The real problem with intramural reforms is in their cumulative effect, which has been to "create
different levels of judicial involvement, and perhaps different classes of
justice, within the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
courts."' 83 The undeniable consequence of all these intramural reforms
is that "the most interesting or notorious [cases] will benefit from intense judicial involvement . . . [while] [o]ther cases get very different
treatment. ' 1 4 How else can one characterize the intramural reforms,
taken together and considered against the tradition of federal appeals of
only thirty years ago?
For good or ill, whether necessary or appropriate, the federal appellate reality today only remotely resembles the federal appellate ideal.
The congressional design of 1891, which survived well past this century's
midpoint, has collapsed under the caseload. No longer is it true that
every appeal is decided collegially by three judges, after reading the
briefs and record, after an oral argument, with a full written opinion.
The "crisis of volume" has been survived, but the coping mechanisms
have abandoned the received tradition. What is left amounts to this:
The appeal of right guaranteed by statute seems to guarantee only a
review by staff working under judicial supervision. Traditional
appellate review is reserved for only a select portion of the entire
caseload.'
182.

A.B.A. STANDING COM1ITTEE, supra note 136, at 33.

183.

Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 642.

184.

Id.

185. Id. Part of the reason for this situation is that the courts of appeals have been implementing experiment-as-you-go reforms without ever rationally articulating the choices, tradeoffs, and costs of intramural reforms. It has been enough that these measures have kept the
courts of appeals current. See William K. Slate II, Getting to Work on Jud. Workloads, LEGAL
TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1992, at 21. Furthermore, the typical circuit judge does not have a 30-year ten-

ure, and so reforms are experienced in stages. This Article has tried to take a more comprehensive view.
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The courts of appeals have reformed their intramural procedures to
such an extent as to have re-formed themselves as courts. To believe
otherwise, the judges have fooled themselves, according to Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit:
I speak primarily about the courts of appeals. Those who believe we
are doing the same quality work that we did in the past are simply
fooling themselves. We adopt more and more procedures for
"expediting" cases, procedures that ensure that individual cases will get
less attention. In place of the traditional oral argument and written
opinions that we used to provide in most instances, we now all too
often give cases second-class treatment. We merely look at the files and
then issue unpublished memorandum dispositions or orders.
The use of these makeshift procedures ensures that many cases do
not get the full attention they deserve, and the quality of our work
1
suffers. It is a most unsatisfactory way for us to have to do our job. 1 6
The solutions of this generation have become the problems for the
next.1
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186. Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts - Too Few Judges, Too Many
Cases, A.B.A. J. January 1993, at 52.
187. "The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the
preceding generation's procedural reforms." Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORrELL L.
REV. 603, 624 (1985).

